| |
| | Rough Sketch for Chapter One -- “ |
 | | Yet, others approach the issue of liberal virtue from the comprehensive camp. Galston, for one, argues that attempts to provide a neutral framework for liberal justice (such as Rawls' theory) prove to be fruitless, since all such attempts ultimately rely upon substantive, comprehensive moral commitments which embody distinctive visions of human worth and human purposes. |
 | | And notably, liberal theorists of virtue have adopted this commonsense opinion. For example, Macedo claims that, fundamentally, liberalism is about toleration and the protection of individual liberty. What justice requires, therefore, is first and foremost the establishment of the rule of law and a constitutionally limited government. |
 | | Thus, the values that conflict with the political conception of justice and its sustaining virtues may be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with the very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual respect. |
| www.american-philosophy.org /archives/past_conference_programs/pc2005/MacLean.htm (1188 words) |
|