| | John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 Duke L. J. 901 (2001) (Site not responding. Last check: 2007-10-29) |
 | | Tricameralism -- the requirement that federal legislation be passed by two houses of the legislature and be either approved by the president or passed by a two-thirds vote of both houses over a presidential veto -- also helped assure that the federal government acts for the public good. |
 | | Second, tricameralism has declined with the rise of the modern administrative state because, pursuant to congressional delegation, administrative agencies may impose regulations without overcoming the hurdle of legislative passage in two houses and presidential approval. |
 | | the supermajoritarianism implicit in tricameralism may be justified on the basis that these antiregulatory special interests are unlikely, over the whole range of the legislature's regulatory jurisdiction, to counterbalance the sum of the regulatory, majoritarian, and special interests in favor of regulation. |
| www.law.duke.edu /journals/dlj/articles/DLJ51P901.HTM (17586 words) |