Type physicalism - Factbites

Type physicalism - Factbites
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Topic: Type physicalism

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	The Identity Theory of Mind
		In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a species of physicalism, I should say that this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism.
		The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain.
		The identity theorist could say that on any occasion this fuzziness is matched by the fuzziness of the brain state that constitutes the belief or desire.
	setis.library.usyd.edu.au /stanford/entries/mind-identity

	post-angst
		But the former does not entail the latter, seeing that an account of scientific reduction might shed light on those cases where the world shows itself in a simple and uniform way even if, contrary to reductive physicalism, the world does not always show itself in a simple and uniform physical way.
		Traditional reductive physicalists may feel that Bickle is far too generous, and that he should simply dig in his type-reductive heels, especially given his laudable efforts to answer the problem of multiple realization within the same individual over time (126-38; cf.
		Their utility stands quite apart from any philosophical aims they are enlisted to serve, chiefly, the doctrine of reductive physicalism (chaps.
	www4.ncsu.edu:8030 /~rpendico/post-angst.html

	Rezensionen/Reviews
		Reduction, in this sense, is a classical topic and logical physicalism has long tried to spell out the commitment to reduction in philosophy of mind to reach a distinctive position.
		Non-reductive physicalism as a philosophy of mind can be characterized by the conjunction of two assumptions, the ontological assumption of token-physicalism and the epistemological assumption of antireductionism.
		Insofar as the formulation of genuine type-identity statements requires success of the reductive approach, there is every reason for doubt.
	www.protosociology.de /Rezensionen.htm

	Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - physicalism
		Another type of physicalism might be called causal physicalism, the view that all causes are physical causes.
		As used in the philosophy of science, physicalism is the view that all factual knowledge can be formulated as a statement about physical objects and activities.
		It is the primary meaning of physicalism in the philosophy of science.
	www.artsci.wustl.edu /~philos/MindDict/physicalism.html

	The Identity Theory of Mind
		In taking the identity theory (in its various forms) as a species of physicalism, I should say that this is an ontological, not a translational physicalism.
		Jackson, F., Pargetter, R. and Prior, E. 1982: ‘Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories’, Philosophical Studies, 42, 209-225.
		The identity theory of mind holds that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain.
	setis.library.usyd.edu.au /stanford/entries/mind-identity

	Fodor.Concepts.html
		If the notion of orthography involved in Mentalese were the ordinary one, this would commit the defender of this reply to a strong from of type-type physicalism of Mentalese vehicles across heads.
		It may be that there is something like a Mentalese alphabet in each head with a common orthography, and different vehicles involved in different concepts correspond to alphabetically distinct types on the basis of their syntactic/orthographic roles, regardless of whether those types have the same meaning roles.
		But, one might say, the functional roles used in typing Mentalese tokens in explaining Frege puzzles are not meaning roles, but purely syntactic or orthographic roles.
	web.clas.ufl.edu /users/maydede/Fodor.Concepts.html

	MaxwellA.txt
		We might even adopt some specific version of physicalism, which asserts that the underlying physical unity is of a specific type: it is made up of a unified field perhaps, o, a quantum field, or empty topologically complex curved space-time, or a quantum string field.
		Whereas (i) constitute fixed criteria of simplicity or unity (as long as physicalism is not modified), (ii) constitute evolving criteria, criteria of unity that improve with improving knowledge.
		Within AOE, there is a second way in which the unity of T may be assessed: in terms of the extent to which the content of T exemplifies the best available level 3 metaphysical blueprint.
	philsci-archive.pitt.edu /archive/00000251/00/MaxwellA.txt

	Encyclopedia article on Philosophy of mind [EncycloZine]
		This view is known as type-physicalism (or type-identity theory).
		Consciousness is one of the most problematic areas of modern philosophy and neuroscience.
		For example, when John feels a particular pain P (at a particular time T), a particular mental event M is occurring (at a particular time T); now is that pain, P, even possibly the same as something that occurs in John's brain, such as the firing of some special group of neurons, M? Mental properties
	encyclozine.com /Philosophy_of_mind (1496 words)

	Confirmation and the Computational Paradigm
		The idea that human cognitive capacities are explainable by computational models is often conjoined with the idea that, while the states postulated by such models are in fact realized by brain states, there are no type-type correlations between the states postulated by computational models and brain states (a corollary of token physicalism).
		According to this paradigm, a theory of how some physical symbol system possesses a certain ability begins by specifying those input and output states of the system which are such that a system possesses that particular ability just in case it gives those outputs under those input conditions.
		According to this paradigm of explanation, then, this symbol-level description of the input and output states of a system and an algorithm effective for transforming the former into the latter, together with semantic interpretations of all the symbol states involved in the process, constitute a computational theory of the how the system possesses that ability.
	cogprints.org /327/00/confirm.htm (1496 words)

	Philosophy of Mind Bibliography, Part 3: Metaphysics of Mind
		Argues for type-type identities and for an expanded view of the physical, as properties from physics exhibit the same sort of multiple realizability as functional properties.
		Psychological kinds can't be reduced to physical kinds, due to cross-classification, although token physicalism still holds.
		A collection of articles on supervenience and causation in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, with some added postscripts.
	consc.net /biblio/3.html (3071 words)

	Non Reduction
		Now it seems Functionalism is also becoming shakier, in many people’s opinion, so some have returned to a reformed Type Identity Physicalism in the form of the ‘wetware’ theory.
		The latter being the view that the mind is a special kind of physiological process (probably biochemical at base), thus taking a reformed Type Identity approach.
		And as the former involved an unacceptable degree of species chauvanism (from both an empirical and moral perspective) we had to take the latter path.
	www.angelfire.com /journal2/studentpage/Non_Reductionist.htm (3071 words)

	Identity Theory [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		A family of views on the relationship between mind and body, Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states.
		So the Identity Theory, taken as a theory of types rather than tokens, must make some claim to the effect that mental states such as pain (and not just individual instances of pain) are contingently identical with--and therefore theoretically reducible to--physical states such as c-fiber excitation.
		Physicalism would survive, but barely, and in a distinctly non-reductive form.
	www.utm.edu /research/iep/i/identity.htm (3071 words)

	Identity Theory [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
		A family of views on the relationship between mind and body, Type Identity theories hold that at least some types (or kinds, or classes) of mental states are, as a matter of contingent fact, literally identical with some types (or kinds, or classes) of brain states.
		So the Identity Theory, taken as a theory of types rather than tokens, must make some claim to the effect that mental states such as pain (and not just individual instances of pain) are contingently identical with--and therefore theoretically reducible to--physical states such as c-fiber excitation.
		Physicalism would survive, but barely, and in a distinctly non-reductive form.
	www.iep.utm.edu /i/identity.htm (2841 words)

	What is Functionalism? Functionalism is one of the major proposals that have been offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Solutions to the mind/body problem usually try to answer questions such as: What is the ultimate nature of the mental? At the
		Functionalism and Physicalism Theories of the mind prior to functionalism have been concerned both with (1) what there is and (2) with what gives each type of mental state its own identity, for example what pains have in common in virtue of which they are pains.
		Another reaction is to stick with short-arm inputs and outputs that stop at the surfaces of the body, thinking of the intentional contents thereby characterized as narrow--supervening on the non-relational physical properties of the body.
		(5) Just as one functional state can be realized in different ways, one physical state can realize different functional states in different machines.
	www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/functionalism.html (4444 words)

	MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY (THEORIES OF MIND)
		Standard formulation of physicalism: mental events are physical events in the brain.
		Mind-Brain Correlation Thesis: For each type M of mental event that occurs to an organism o, there exists a brain state of kind B (M's "neural correlate" or "substrate") such that M occurs to o at time t if and only if B occurs to o at t.
		thought the brain was where mind/soul interacted with body: the seat of the soul
	brainmeta.com /mind/mind3.html (4444 words)

	TREATISE ON FREEDOM & FATE
		Scientific method as determined by physicalism is unsuitable as an instrument of discovering purposive order or of meaning that is inherent in the most important areas of human life: the realm of purposive action, of the inner relations of mind and of spiritual vision.
		Human beings would be sheer automatons in a (very complex) mechanical type of universe without any freedom of will, however limited.
		The insistence of scientific theorists on there being one cause of each event is understandable, because this has proven a very fruitful assumption indeed to the methodic progress of analysis and experiment in physics and the allied natural sciences.
	www.saiguru.net /english/articles/44treatise.htm (4444 words)

	Atheistic Materialism or Physicalism
		Materialism (or physicalism) can signify either a broad metaphysical view, or, more narrowly, a type of theory of mind.
		Metaphysical materialism is a specific kind of naturalism which contends that everything that exists is either physical or dependent upon the physical.
		In the broad sense, nonreductive materialism holds that everything is physical or at least dependent upon the physical; and in the narrower sense it holds that the mind can have both physical and nonphysical aspects even though it must be instantiated in a physical system like the brain.
	www.infidels.org /library/modern/nontheism/materialism (281 words)

	Inverted Qualia
		Qualia (singular ‘quale’), in a common modern usage, are properties of experiences that type them in phenomenological respects.
		Campbell, N., 2000, “Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States”, Synthese, 124: 239-55.
		Qualia terminology can be introduced in a similar manner for other sorts of visual experiences (seeing differently shaped patches, for instance), for other perceptual modalities, for bodily sensations, and for thoughts, imagery, emotions, and so forth.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/qualia-inverted (14840 words)

	Dictionary of Philosophy
		A unnersal feature is the fusion of religion, metaphysics, ethics and psychology, due to the universal acceptance of a psycho-physicalism, further exemplified in the typical doctrines of karma and samsara (q.v.).
		Two types of introspection may be distinguished: (a) the direct scrutiny of conscious states and processes at the time of their occurrence (See Inspection), and (b) the recovery of past states and processes by a retrospective act.
		Galton's method was applied to mental deficiency by Dugdale ( The Jukes, 1877) and Galton himself extended the same type of inquiry to free association and imagery in Inquiries into Human Faculty, 1883.
	www.ditext.com /runes/i.html (14840 words)

	Physicalism
		According to this notion, reductionism means that the properties expressed by the predicates of (say) a psychological theory are identical to the properties expressed by the predicates of (say) a neurological theory -- in other words, this version of reductionism is in essence a version of type physicalism or the identity theory.
		If we assume that abstract objects, if they exist, exist necessarily, i.e., exist in all possible worlds, then supervenience physicalism is completely silent on the question of whether abstract objects exist.
		Similarly, if the property of having mass is required in a complete account of the intrinsic nature of physical objects and their constituents, then having mass is a physical property.
	plato.stanford.edu /entries/physicalism (14840 words)

	MIND-BRAIN IDENTITY THEORY (THEORIES OF MIND)
		"the classic formulation of the identity theory due to Smart and Feigl is type physicalism" (p.60)
		Kim identity: "The event of x's instantiating property P at time t = the event of y's instantiating property P at time t' if and only if x = y, property P = property Q, and t = t'.
		identity: the different phenomena are really one and the same phenomenon
	brainmeta.com /mind/mind3.html (2511 words)

	Identity theory of mind - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		The identity theory of mind, or type physicalism, holds that the mind is identical to the brain.
		Recently Schopenhauerian pessimism has been resurrected by Mysterians, like Colin McGinn, who argue that it is impossible to know if the mind is identical to the brain.
		Functionalism is the received view of the nature of cognitive science.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Identity_theory_of_mind (286 words)

	Type physicalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Type physicalism (also known as Type Identity Theory, Type-Type theory or just Identity Theory) is the theory, in the philosophy of mind, which asserts that mental events are type-identical to the physical events in the brain with which they are correlated.
		According to Ullin Place, one of the popularizers of the idea of type-identity in the 1950s and '60s, the idea of type-identical mind/body physicalism originated in the 1930s with the psychologist E.
		One of the most influential and common objections to the type identity theory is the argument from multiple realizability.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Identity_theory_of_mind (1266 words)

	The Harder Problem of Consciousness
		I said earlier that it seemed at first glance that a form of physicalism that required that consciousness be constituted by a unitary physical property dictated that Commander Data is not conscious.
		We have an important though vague notion of “fundamentally different” that governs our willingness to regard some differences in realization as variants of the same basic type and others as fundamentally different.
		In other words, the epistemology of theoretical identity is just a special case of inference to the best explanation.
	www.nyu.edu /gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/harder.htm (10338 words)

	Blogger: Email Post to a Friend
		Physicalism, a type of absolute reductionism that believes only material entities exist, is inherently deterministic, since all that exists is simply matter in motion.
		On the other hand, if the determinists suggest option (b), then they have admitted that at least one choice is not determined by pre-existing sufficient conditions, which would be tantamount to abandoning determinism.
		The world is not physically determined, but according to theological determinists everything is determined solely by God’s will.
	www.blogger.com /email-post.g?blogID=7332861&postID=108748257066983555 (10338 words)

	Philosophy of Mind Roadmap
		According to substance dualism, res extensa and res cogitans are the only kinds of substance, and anything that exists must be of one or the other type.
		All forms of materialism/physicalism deny the existence of the Mental (res cogitans).
		Functionalists do not attempt to put ontological limits on the functional states; according to functionalists, the functional states could be human brains, alien brains, Turing machines, CPUs, immaterial souls, etc. as long as the intermediary does the job.
	instruct.westvalley.edu /lafave/Roadmap_Phil_Mind.htm (1754 words)

	Amazon.com: Naturalism, Evolution and Mind (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements): Books: D. M. Walsh
		By now, even the kid down the street must be familiar with the functionalist's response to type-identity physicalism.
		Evolution in Mind: An Introduction to Evolutionary Psychology by H. Plotkin on page 274
		Philosophy of G. Moore by G. Moore on page 60
	www.amazon.com /exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0521003733?v=glance (451 words)

	Logical Positivism J.Passmore (1967)
		Logical positivism, we might say, split into three groups, one asserting physicalism, the second rejecting it, and the third expressing a preference for the physicalist language.
		In his Logical Syntax of Language Carnap had argued that all statements about the "meaning" or "significance" of statements are of the "pseudo object" type and should be translated into a syntactical form.
		The logical positivists thought of themselves as extending the range of science over the whole area of systematic truth and as needing for that purpose to destroy the claim of idealist philosophers to have a special kind of suprascientific access to truth.
	www.comnet.ca /~pballan/logicalpos(Passmore).htm (4269 words)

	Artificial consciousness - free-definition
		If this supposition is correct then the Church-Turing thesis applies and the possibility of Genuine AC being implemented on another machine of the Turing type must be admitted.
		The Genuine AC view assumes that anything that cannot be modelled by AC must be in contradiction with physicalism, but Thomas Nagel in his essay, What is it like to be a bat?
		Artificial consciousness proponents therefore have loosened this constraint and allow that simulating or depicting a conscious machine, such as the robots in Star Wars, could count - not as examples of artificial consciousness, since their personalities are generated by actors, but as models.
	www.free-definition.com /Digital-sentience.html (3041 words)

	Substance dualism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
		Substance dualism is a type of ontological dualism defended by Descartes in which it is claimed that there are two fundamental kinds of substance: mental and material.
		This view contradicts physicalism which is the received view (the view that currently holds "sway") in philosophy of mind.
		Substance dualism is a philosophical position compatible with most theology which posits immortal souls occupying an independent realm of existence, while apparently bodies die.
	en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Substance_dualism (3041 words)

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