| |
| | Weak and Strong Universalizability |
 | | Let me distinguish the weak universalizability from the strong universalizability (although the words sound very similar, my distinction is quite different from Gibbard's 1988, 59-60; as I see it, his distinction is rather concerned with weights of preferences, which will be discussed in the subsequent sections 5, 6, and 7). |
 | | Some may wish to appeal to the concept of morality (e.g., by asserting that at least 'moral ought' is universalizable), and others may admit that the strong universalizability (with respect to evaluative words) is itself a substantive ethical principle, despite its formal and abstract character. |
 | | Notice that, even if we make the universalizability true by vitrue of the meaning of 'moral', we thereby import another substantive question, 'why should we be moral?' Thus, although many of us are, unlike Sidgwick, unhappy with an appeal to 'self-evidence', Sidgwick's claim that the (strong) universalizability of 'ought' is non-tautologous seems still correct. |
| www.bun.kyoto-u.ac.jp /~suchii/4_w&s.univ.html (618 words) |
|