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| | Summa Theologica I-II, 88, 2: Do venial sin and mortal sin differ generically? |
 | | Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. |
 | | For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object. |
 | | Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. |
| people.uvawise.edu /philosophy/PHIL110/Aquinas25.html (668 words) |
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