| | Mind and Anomalous Monism [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] |
 | | Among analytic philosophers of the 1960s, disputes upon this general topic were focused largely around a question that was partly epistemological and partly ontological in its significance, whether or not it is appropriate to view the reasons that people have for performing specific actions as also themselves being causes of those actions. |
 | | According to one school of thought, which more or less began with the Verstehen theorists of the nineteenth century — Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber and Bendetto Croce, among others — the aim of the social sciences and of humanistic enquiry in general is not the discovery of causal relationships at all. |
 | | And regardless of whether one is talking about events, physical objects, thoughts, or whatever, it is surely a perfectly natural and coherent question to ask whether it is because something has a property M that it causes something else to have property N. |
| www.iep.utm.edu /m/anom-mon.htm (5957 words) |