| | NTI: Securing the Bomb: Warhead Dismantlement Transparency |
 | | Similarly, warhead dismantlement transparency was not a major focus of the "Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility" (STI) talks of the mid-1990s, though in a paper outlining the U.S. concept for the overall direction of transparency efforts tabled in December 1994, U.S. negotiators suggested that unspecified measures to confirm warhead dismantlement should be developed and applied. |
 | | For example, as a warhead was first being removed from a particular type of missile (so that there was high confidence that object really was the warhead type for that missile), measurements could be taken on that warhead (or more likely a selection of several such warheads) to create the original template. |
 | | Then, when warheads arrived at a monitored dismantlement facility and were declared to be warheads of that type, measurements would be taken and compared to the template to see whether there was a match or not. |
| www.nti.org /e_research/cnwm/monitoring/dismantle.asp (3912 words) |