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| | Consciousness [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] |
 | | Unlike many of the above objections to materialism, the appeal to the possibility of zombies is often taken as both a problem for materialism and as a more positive argument for some form of dualism, such as property dualism. |
| | It certainly seems logically possible for there to be such creatures: “the conceivability of zombies seems
obvious to me
While this possibility is probably empirically impossible, it certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no contradiction in the description” (Chalmers 1996: 96). |
| | The literature in response to zombie, and related “conceivability,” arguments is enormous (see, for example, Hill 1997, Hill and McLaughlin 1999, Papineau 1998, 2002, Balog 1999, Block and Stalnaker 1999, Loar 1999, Yablo 1999, Perry 2001, Botterell 2001). |
| www.iep.utm.edu /c/consciou.htm (17645 words) |
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